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Abstract 
 
 
We examine how taxes impact giving to charity and how this relationship is affected by the degree 
of wasteful government spending. In our model, government collects a flat-rate tax on income net 
of charitable donations and redistributes part of the tax revenue. The rest of the tax revenue is 
wasted. The model predicts that (i) a higher tax rate increases charitable donations, (ii) a higher 
rate of waste increases (decreases) donations when the elasticity of marginal utility is low (high), 
and (iii) the marginal effect of the tax rate on donations is always larger than the marginal effect 
of the rate of waste on donations. We test these predictions using a laboratory experiment with 
actual donations to charities. We find that the tax rate on average has a weak and insignificant 
effect on giving. The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and highly significant effect 
on giving, with the relationship being moderated by the elasticity of marginal utility. We discuss 
potential policy implications of our findings. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent polls conducted in the US show that people believe that part of the tax revenue is 
wasted by the government. According to a 2014 Gallup Poll, Americans estimate that the federal 
government wastes 51% of each tax dollar.1 Similarly, according to a HuffPost/YouGov poll 
conducted in 2013, 69% of Americans think that most of the federal budget deficit could be 
eliminated by cutting "waste and fraud,” where examples of wasteful government spending include 
salaries and perks for government employees, foreign aid, and military spending.2 
In this paper we study how taxation affects giving in the presence of a redistributive 
government that wastes part of the tax revenue. A sizable literature studies the effect of a tax rate 
on charitable donations and argues that an increase in the tax rate decreases both the price of giving 
and the income of donors, creating an ambiguous net effect. When part of the tax revenue is wasted 
(instead of being redistributed back), both the price of giving and the net income of individuals 
depend not only on the tax rate but also on the degree of waste. To examine how taxes impact 
giving and how this relationship is affected by the wastefulness of government spending, we 
provide a theoretical model and conduct a laboratory experiment.  
In our model, a public good is provided through private contributions by individuals. The 
government’s role is to collect a flat-rate tax on income net of contributions to the public good and 
to redistribute the tax revenue. During redistribution, part of the collected tax revenue is wasted 
(e.g., government spends this money on things that the individuals do not value). Our theoretical 
model can isolate the effects of the tax rate and wasteful government spending on giving. 
Consistent with previous theoretical and empirical literature, our model predicts that under 
innocuous conditions the substitution effect dominates the income effect and, hence, there is a 
positive relationship between donations and the tax rate. The novelty of our paper is to study the 
relationship between the level of waste and donations to charities. We find that the substitution 
effect generated by a higher tax rate is larger than the substitution effect generated by a higher 
                                                 
1 See http://www.gallup.com/poll/176102/americans-say-federal-gov-wastes-cents-dollar.aspx. The estimated rate of 
waste differs across Republicans and Democrats, with Republicans estimating 59 cents and Democrats estimating 42 
cents per dollar. In this paper in order to isolate the effect of waste on giving we consider a simple model with 
individuals being homogenous with respect to their perceptions. 
2 See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/18/wasteful-spending-poll_n_2886081.html. Based on the survey 
responses the article argues that “for many, waste is indeed defined as ‘money spent on some government program I 
don’t like’.” Note that these perceptions may exogenously change over time depending on government actions or even 
through simple debates (e.g., discussions of wasteful government spending during elections may heighten individuals’ 
perception about waste). 
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level of waste, while the income effects are similar. Therefore, the marginal effect of the tax rate 
on donations is always larger than the marginal effect of the rate of waste on donations. 
Furthermore, our model shows that the income effect may dominate the substitution effect when 
the rate of waste increases depending on the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
consumption. In addition, we show that when the economy is large enough, the substitution effect 
due to a change in the degree of waste approaches zero independent of the elasticity of marginal 
utility. Therefore, in large economies, the income effect always dominates the substitution effect 
when the degree of waste increases, leading to a negative relationship between the rate of waste 
and donations.  
We test our model using a laboratory experiment with actual donations to charities. As 
opposed to naturally occurring data, our controlled environment shuts down the possibility of 
differences in belief about how tax revenue is used, changes in income over time, as well as other 
potential confounds which one usually needs to control for when estimating the impact of taxes on 
charitable donations (see, for example, Andreoni and Payne, 2013). In our experiment, participants 
earn income, part of which they can donate to a charity. Participants choose their donation amount 
knowing that a flat-rate tax would be applied on their remaining income, and part of the collected 
tax revenue would go back to the experimenter, with the remaining part evenly redistributed among 
the participants within their group. By changing the level of taxes and how much of the tax revenue 
is wasted (i.e., money received neither by charities nor by participants), we are able to isolate and 
test the impact of the tax rate and wasteful tax revenue spending on giving in a controlled setting. 
Our results show that the tax rate on average has a weak and insignificant effect on giving. 
The degree of waste, however, has a large, negative and highly significant effect on giving. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find that the relationship between giving and waste 
is moderated by the elasticity of marginal utility. Moreover, as predicted, the marginal effect of 
the tax rate on donations is statistically significantly larger than the marginal effect of the rate of 
waste on donations. Also, we document substantial heterogeneity in how individuals respond to 
changes in the tax rate and the degree of waste.  
Our study has important policy implications. First, we find that on average the relationship 
between the tax rate and donations is weak, suggesting that higher taxes may not change charitable 
giving (in environments where income loss from taxation is very salient). Second, the degree of 
waste plays a large role in giving decisions. Our experiment shows that even when the number of 
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people in a given group is very small, the average effect of wasteful government spending on 
giving is negative. Our theory predicts that for larger economies the effect of wasteful government 
spending would be even more negative. Increasing the efficiency of how tax revenues are used, as 
well as providing individuals with better information on public services financed by tax revenues 
could make a big difference in generating additional charitable giving. Third, tax rates might 
endogenously affect perception about wasteful government spending. For example, if higher taxes 
imply higher perception about waste, then we may actually see a decrease – not increase – in 
charitable donations as taxes increase. Empirical studies estimating price and income elasticities 
of giving would benefit by controlling for the confounding effect of perception about wasteful 
government spending. 
We discuss related literature in Section 2. In Section 3 we present a theoretical model and 
develop testable hypotheses. In Section 4 we discuss our experimental design and procedures. 
Section 5 provides our results and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
In the United States, individual donations constitute one of the major sources of revenue 
for many charities. Since most charitable donations are tax deductible, a higher tax rate affects 
charitable giving in two major ways. On the one hand, because of deduction benefits, higher taxes 
decrease the price of giving, which leads to a positive effect on giving (the substitution effect). On 
the other hand, higher taxes reduce after-tax net income, which has a negative effect (the income 
effect). The empirical literature provides mixed findings on the magnitude of the net effect 
(Clotfelter, 1985, 1990; Randolph, 1995; Auten et al., 2002; Bakija and Heim, 2011; Hungerman 
and Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2016).  
Earlier empirical studies using cross-sectional data argue that a tax cut leads to a decrease 
in charitable giving. In particular, Clotfelter (1985, 1990) estimates the price elasticity to be greater 
than one in absolute value while income elasticity to be less than one. Using panel data, Randolph 
(1995) finds that charitable giving is relatively insensitive to price changes, suggesting that 
permanent changes in the price of giving have a small effect on voluntary contributions. In 
contrast, Auten et al. (2002) find substantial permanent price elasticity using a different estimation 
technique. More recently, Bakija and Heim (2011) find the price elasticity greater than one in 
absolute value, while Hungerman and Ottoni-Wilhelm (2016) report a price elasticity of 0.2. 
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Observational data suffers from problems such as omitted variables and endogeneity biases and, 
therefore, the estimates of price and income elasticities are very sensitive to the estimation 
techniques. While, in general, the substitution effect of a tax rate increase is expected to dominate 
the income effect, the magnitude of the net effect of taxation on charitable donations is still not 
clearly understood (Andreoni, 2006; List, 2011; Vesterlund, 2016). 
A theoretical foundation for the impact of taxation on charitable giving has been provided 
by Warr (1982) and Bergstrom et al. (1986). These papers show that purely redistributive taxation 
(that does not change the set of contributors) should have no effect on total public goods provision.3 
Uler (2009) extends the standard model by assuming that charitable donations to the public good 
are tax deductible and, therefore, redistribution takes place over income net of contributions. The 
model demonstrates that, under a general class of utility functions, the substitution effect 
dominates the income effect. Hence, charitable giving increases when the tax rate increases. To 
the best of our knowledge, however, none of the theoretical models has addressed the case of 
wasteful government spending (i.e., the case when part of the tax revenue is wasted). 
Besides empirical and theoretical work, a number of experimental studies have analyzed 
how price and income affect individuals giving. Most experimental studies find that, as predicted 
by economic theory, giving decreases in price (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Andreoni and 
Miller, 2002).4 For example, Eckel and Grossman (2003) conduct a laboratory experiment in 
which participants choose how much to contribute to a charity under different rebate and match 
rates and find that contributions decrease in price.5 Eckel and Grossman (2008) replicate their 
laboratory findings in a natural field setting. Similarly, Karlan and List (2007) find a negative 
relationship between price and giving for some range of prices.6 Experimental evidence about the 
relationship between income and giving is mixed. Eckel and Grossman (2003, 2008), Eckel et al. 
(2007) and Rey-Biel et al. (2015) find a positive relationship between income and giving, while 
                                                 
3 This result would not hold if individuals also have warm-glow motives (Andreoni, 1990). Impure altruism model 
explains why crowding out is not complete when government provides public funds to charities. Interestingly, 
Hungerman (2014) shows that when individuals hide income, this creates a deadweight loss and this leads to a 
surprising finding: warm-glow implies more crowding out in a setting where individuals can evade taxes. 
4 Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001) focus on gender differences in altruism and show that men are more price sensitive. 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) show that the preferences for altruism can be explained by rational models. 
5 They also find that participants are sensitive to how a subsidy is framed. Other studies comparing subsidy types 
include Davis et al. (2005), Davis and Millner (2005), Eckel and Grossman (2006a, 2006b), and Blumenthal et al. 
(2012). 
6 They find that offering to match contributions ($1:$1) increases individual giving. However, further lowering the 
price by offering larger match ratios ($3:$1 and $2:$1) has no additional impact on giving. 
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other studies find a negative relationship (Erkal et al., 2011) or no significant relationship at all 
(Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Buckley and Croson, 2006).7 
Perhaps the most related study to ours is by Uler (2011), examining how taxes impact 
individual contributions within a laboratory public goods setting. However, field experiments 
testing economic theories demonstrate that the results of laboratory experiments may not translate 
into real world decisions (Levitt and List, 2007). In the public goods game experiments, donations 
have monetary benefits to each participant, while charitable contributions in the field have no 
direct personal monetary gain. Most importantly, however, our study differs from previous work 
by examining how wasteful government spending impacts individual giving. 
In order to isolate the direct effects of tax rate and wasteful government spending on giving, 
our experimental study controls for two important confounds that are difficult to control for when 
using naturally occurring data. First, wasteful government spending may provoke tax evasion 
which might in turn affect charitable donations. Barone and Mocetti (2011) find that the attitude 
towards paying taxes is better when resources are spent more efficiently, and Alm et al. (2016) 
show that corruption results in higher levels of tax evasion. Our experimental design eliminates 
tax evasion as a potential confound by automatically taxing all participants in the experiment. 
Second, there is a possibility of tax rates affecting labor supply decisions; see Saez et al. (2012) 
for a survey of this literature. Our experimental design eliminates this confound by assigning 
income to participants prior to the knowledge that part of this income will be taxed. 
 
3. The Theoretical Model and Hypotheses 
3.1. The Model 
We consider an environment with one private good, one pure public good, and 𝑛 > 1 
agents. The public good is provided privately through charitable contributions. Each agent 𝑖 has 
an exogenous endowment of 𝑦𝑖 units of private good, and decides to contribute 𝑔𝑖 to the public 
good. One unit of public good can be produced by one unit of private good. Therefore, the level 
of public good provision is equal to the total giving, i.e., 𝐺 = ∑ 𝑔𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . The total amount of 
endowment in the economy is denoted by 𝑌 = ∑ 𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1 . 
                                                 
7 In a survey paper on empirical findings, Auten et al. (2000) argues that the relationship between income and 
donations is U-shaped. 
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The government collects a flat-rate tax 𝑡, 0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1, on income net of contributions to the 
public good and redistributes a fraction of the tax revenue equally.8 During redistribution, part of 
the collected tax revenue 𝑤, 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1, is wasted.9 Therefore, individual 𝑖’s private consumption 
𝑐𝑖, after contributing to the public good, paying his/her taxes and receiving refund from the 
government, is given by 
𝑐𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤)
𝑡 ∑ (𝑦𝑗−𝑔𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
.     (1) 
The preferences of individuals are represented by an additively separable utility function 
𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + 𝑣(𝐺), where 𝑢(. ) and 𝑣(. ) are strictly increasing, strictly concave, twice continuously 
differentiable functions and satisfy the Inada conditions. Finally, in order to simplify the analysis, 
we assume everyone contributes in the equilibrium. Note that this latter assumption is reasonable 
as long as the ex-ante wealth inequality is not very large (Bergstrom et al., 1986; Uler, 2009).10 
Each individual chooses their contribution level by taking other individuals’ contributions 
as given. If everyone contributes in the equilibrium, the first order condition for an individual 𝑖 
simplifies to: 
𝑢′(𝑐𝑖) (1 − (1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
) 𝑡) = 𝑣′(𝐺).       (2) 
Since the right hand side of this equation is the same for each individual, we can infer that 
in equilibrium all agents consume the same amount of the private good. Note that this implies that 
the “distribution neutrality” result of Bergstrom et al. (1986) holds in this model as well: total 
                                                 
8 Two comments: First, we focus on the redistributive role of the government and assume the tax revenue is being 
redistributed. Since redistribution is a special form of a public good, it is not difficult to generalize the model to any 
public good provision as long as the government provides a different public good than the charity. The only difference 
is that this time our results will condition on the utility over the public good provided by the government (instead of 
on the consumption utility). Second, we also investigate the case where government and the charity provide the same 
public good (i.e., Andreoni, 1993; Bolton and Katok, 1998; Eckel et al., 2005; Li et al., 2011). We find that, if the 
government uses tax revenue to provide the same public good as the charity (or to provide a grant to the charitable 
organization), then higher tax rate always leads to lower donations to charities when the level of waste is fixed and 
higher rate of waste by the government always leads to higher donations to charities when the tax rate is fixed. Note 
that the reason this case always generates a negative relationship between tax rate and donations (and a positive 
relationship between waste and donations) is because governmental provision and charitable provision are substitutes. 
While this case is also interesting, in this paper we choose to present the case where government and the charity 
provides different public goods. Therefore, donations are expected to increase with the tax rate which is consistent 
with the empirical literature in this particular context.   
9 One can think of the waste as government funding programs that the individuals do not care for, or alternatively, it 
could be considered as inefficient spending. 
10 Our results on the effect of the tax rate and the degree of waste on giving do not depend on this assumption. Proofs 
dropping this assumption are available upon request. 
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public goods provision does not depend on the initial income distribution.11 The first order 
condition simplifies to: 
𝑢′ ((1 − 𝑤𝑡) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)) (1 − (1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
) 𝑡) = 𝑣′(𝐺),     (3) 
This condition is intuitive. Each agent chooses the level of contribution that would equalize the 
marginal benefit of contributing to the marginal cost of an additional unit of contribution. Note 
that the equilibrium is uniquely determined.12 
The first question we would like to answer is what happens to contributions when the tax 
rate increases for a given degree of waste. From equation (3) we see that higher taxes have two 
opposing effects on the equilibrium level of contributions: (i) a higher tax rate implies a lower 
price of giving which has a positive effect on contributions (the substitution effect), (ii) a higher 
tax rate implies a lower ex-post consumption, which has a negative effect on contributions (the 
income effect). In order to solve for the net effect of taxes on giving, we differentiate equation (3) 
with respect to the tax rate 𝑡 and then solve for 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
 : 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
= −
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤(
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)+𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎
𝑣′′(𝐺)+𝑢′′(𝑏)(
1−𝑤𝑡
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)
,       (4) 
where 𝑎 = 1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
 and 𝑏 = (1 − 𝑤𝑡) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
). Since the denominator is always negative, the sign 
of the numerator determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺 with respect to 𝑡. Our first result, 
generalizing the findings of Bergstrom et al. (1986) and Uler (2009), follows: 
Theorem 1: For a given degree of waste 0 < 𝑤 < 1, if 𝑢(𝑥) satisfies −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
≤ 1, then 
the total public good provision 𝐺 is a strictly increasing function of the tax rate 𝑡.13 
While Uler (2009) shows that in the interior equilibrium, total public good provision 𝐺 is 
a strictly increasing function of the tax rate 𝑡 independent of the curvature of the consumption 
                                                 
11 Similar to Bergstrom et al. (1986), this result holds only when the set of contributors do not change as the initial 
income distribution changes. If the set of contributors change when initial income distribution changes, then the model 
would predict higher contributions when income inequality increases. Hence, similar to Bergstrom et al. (1986) and 
Uler (2009) there is a trade-off between contributions and (initial) income equality. 
12 This can be seen by using equation (3) and the fact that each individual consume the same amount of the private 
good. 
13 Note that if 𝑤 = 1, total public goods provision would still be a strictly increasing function of the tax rate, if 
−
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
< 1. 
9 
 
utility, Theorem 1 shows that curvature becomes important when there is waste.14 Theorem 1 states 
that when 𝑤 > 0, whether individuals increase their donations when the tax rate increases depends 
on the elasticity of the marginal utility function with respect to consumption, given by −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
.15 
Note that in environments that involve risk, the same coefficient is also referred to as the relative 
risk aversion coefficient. See Appendix A for a proof of Theorem 1.  
Corollary 1: If the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the Constant Relative 
Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function 𝑢 =
𝑥(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)
 for 𝜃 ≠ 1 and 𝑢 = ln⁡(𝑥) for 𝜃 = 1, then 
Theorem 1 implies that, for a given degree of waste and for 𝜃 ≤ 1, public good provision strictly 
increases when the tax rate increases. 
The conditions provided in Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 are very mild. Therefore, one would 
expect substitution effect to dominate the income effect in the context of donations and the tax 
rate. 
Next, we analyze the relationship between the degree of waste and donations while fixing 
the tax rate. From equation (3) we see that a higher degree of waste has two opposing effects on 
the equilibrium level of contributions: (i) a higher degree of waste implies a lower price of giving 
which has a positive effect on contributions (the substitution effect), (ii) a higher degree of waste 
implies a lower ex-post consumption which has a negative effect on contributions (the income 
effect). These opposing effects are very similar to the ones with the tax rate. In fact, the income 
effects of changing 𝑡 and 𝑤 are similar. However, note that the effect of a small change in the tax 
rate on the price of giving is given by (1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
), whereas the effect of a small change in the rate 
of waste on the price of giving is given by 
𝑡
𝑛
. Since (1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
) is always greater than 
𝑡
𝑛
, the 
substitution effect in the case of waste is not as strong as the substitution effect in the case of tax 
rate 𝑡. Therefore, the condition we derived in Theorem 1 will not hold here. A formal argument 
for this intuition is stated in Theorem 4. 
                                                 
14 When 𝑤 = 0 there is only the substitution effect, and hence the effect of taxes on giving becomes trivial, and does 
not require any additional assumptions on the utility function. 
15 Note that 
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
=
𝑑𝑢′(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥
𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
=
𝑑𝑢′(𝑥)
𝑢′(𝑥)
𝑑𝑥
𝑥
. It can also be interpreted as the sensitivity of the marginal rate of substitution 
between private consumption and public good consumption to price changes: the derivative of marginal rate of 
substitution with respect to the price of private consumption (see Mirrlees, 1971). 
10 
 
In order to solve for the net effect of 𝑤 on giving, we differentiate equation (3) with respect 
to 𝑤 and then solve for 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
: 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
= −
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡(
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)+𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
𝑣′′(𝐺)+𝑢′′(𝑏)(
1−𝑤𝑡
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)
.       (5) 
Since the denominator in equation (5) is always negative, the sign of the numerator 
determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺 with respect to 𝑤. Theorem 2 gives sufficient 
conditions for the substitution effect to dominate the income effect. Appendix A provides a proof. 
Theorem 2: For a given tax rate 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 1, if 𝑢(𝑥) satisfies −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
≤
1
𝑛
, then the total 
public good provision 𝐺 is a strictly increasing function of the degree of waste 𝑤. 
There are two important observations to make. First, Theorem 2 provides a stronger 
condition relative to Theorem 1, and, therefore, the condition may not hold. Second, the sufficient 
condition depends not only on the shape of the utility function but also on the number of people in 
the economy 𝑛. As 𝑛 increases it becomes harder for this condition to hold.16 In fact, for large 
economies (when 𝑛 → ∞), this condition will not hold for any consumption utility with 
diminishing marginal returns. This important result suggests that the income effect may dominate 
the substitution effect and lead to a negative relationship between the rate of waste and donations 
to the public good even when the substitution effect dominates the income effect for a tax rate 
change. The intuition for why the income effect may dominate the substitution effect when the rate 
of waste changes is that, for large economies, collected taxes have very little direct price incentives 
for individuals. In fact, as 𝑛 → ∞, the direct benefit from a price change converges to zero, which 
also implies that the substitution effect converges to zero. But even for a small number of agents 
it is not hard to see that the condition in Theorem 2 can be violated. Corollary 2 shows a very 
standard utility function that demonstrates this possibility. 
Corollary 2: If the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the CRRA utility 
function 𝑢 =
𝑥(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)
 for 𝜃 ≠ 1 and 𝑢 = ln⁡(𝑥) for 𝜃 = 1, then Theorem 2 implies that giving strictly 
increases when the degree of waste increases if 𝜃 ≤
1
𝑛
. Note that for any 𝜃 > 0.5, this condition 
will not be satisfied for any number of agents. 
                                                 
16 In the experiment, we have three people in one group. Note that if this condition does not hold for 𝑛 = 3, then we 
do not expect it to hold with 𝑛 > 3. In fact, our data suggest that this condition does not hold for 𝑛 = 3. 
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While Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 are very useful in providing the sufficient conditions for 
a positive relationship between donations and the rate of waste, they do not inform us when to 
expect a definite negative relationship between donations and the rate of waste. Theorem 3 derives 
a sufficient condition for donations to decrease in the degree of waste under the CRRA utility 
function. Proofs are available in Appendix A. 
Theorem 3: If the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the CRRA utility 
function, giving strictly decreases when the degree of waste increases if 𝜃 >
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
.17  
Note that the condition in Theorem 3 is automatically satisfied for any positive 𝜃⁡in very 
large economies. Corollary 3 shows that if individuals have logarithmic consumption utility, then 
charitable donations increase when the tax rate increases and they decrease when the degree of 
waste increases independent of the size of the economy. 
Corollary 3: If the agents’ consumption preferences are given by ln(𝑐) + 𝑣(𝐺), where 
𝜃 = 1, our model predicts: (i) for a given 𝑤, public good provision increases when 𝑡 increases, (ii) 
for a given 𝑡, public good provision decreases when 𝑤 increases.  
Note that (i) is true because the sufficient condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied, and (ii) comes 
from Theorem 3 since 
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
< 1 for any 𝑛 ≥ 2. 
Finally, Theorem 4 summarizes the comparison between the impacts of a tax change on 
donations versus a change in the degree of waste on donations and shows that the marginal effect 
of increasing the tax rate on giving is larger than the marginal effect of increasing the degree of 
waste on giving.  
Theorem 4: If 𝑢(𝑥) satisfies −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
≤ 𝑛, then 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
>
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
⁡at any levels of tax and waste.  
Note that the sufficient condition in Theorem 4 is very weak and should be satisfied given 
any standard utility function. We could even argue that for most standard utility functions the 
sufficient condition in Theorem 1 is satisfied. However, the sufficient conditions in Theorems 2 
and 3 may or may not be satisfied. 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 Note that 
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
≥
1
𝑛
 for any 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1. When 𝑤 = 1, 
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
=
1
𝑛
. 
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3.2. Hypotheses 
Next we derive three testable hypotheses. First, assuming elasticity of marginal utility is 
less than or equal to 1, we conjecture that individual donations should increase when the tax rate 
increases:18 
Hypothesis 1: For a given waste 𝑤, individual donations increase when the tax rate 𝑡 
increases.  
However, donations may increase or decrease when the degree of waste increases 
depending on the elasticity of marginal utility. 19 
Hypothesis 2: The relationship between giving and 𝑤 depends on the elasticity of marginal 
utility. 
Finally, we suggest a way of testing the model that does not rely on the elasticity of 
marginal utility coefficient. Based on Theorem 4, we provide the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 3: The marginal effect of the tax rate on giving is greater than the marginal 
effect of the degree of waste on giving for any 0 < 𝑡 < 1 and 0 < 𝑤 < 1. 
By conducting an experiment with real donations, we have the needed control to test these 
hypotheses and we also can examine the net effect of the degree of waste on charitable donations. 
 
4. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The data come from an experiment conducted at the University of Michigan. In the 
Harrison and List (2004) taxonomy, our experiment is a ‘framed field experiment’ where 
participants have a chance to donate to actual charities. A total of 204 students participated in 12 
experimental sessions.20 Each session lasted one hour and fifteen minutes, on average, and had 
either 12 or 18 participants. The experiment proceeded in four parts and it was programmed using 
z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). The currency used in all parts of the experiment was U.S. 
dollars. Upon completion of the experiment, earnings from all parts of the experiment were added 
                                                 
18 The main reason for making this assumption is to be consistent with the large empirical literature on taxes and 
donations which suggest a positive relationship. In addition, in our experiment, only 7 people did not satisfy this 
condition, according to our calculations based on our risk elicitation task in the experiment, which was used to 
approximate the elasticity of marginal utility coefficient. However, this assumption is not crucial for the theory or the 
data analysis.  
19 In Section 5.2, we also allow for heterogeneity and analyze whether individuals with different elasticity of marginal 
utility behave differently. We will use a risk elicitation task to approximate these elasticity coefficients and 
hypothesize that “If the relative risk aversion coefficient is not large, then donations will increase when w increases. 
If the relative risk aversion coefficent is large, then donations will decrease when w increases. 
20 These were mostly undergraduate students recruited by using the ORSEE software. 
13 
 
to a participation payment of $5. Participants received their payments in private and in cash, 
ranging from $15.50 to $57.75. 
At the beginning of each part of the experiment, all participants were given written 
instructions, see Appendix B, and an experimenter read the instructions aloud. In part 1, 
participants took a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 multiple-choice questions. The 
questions were drawn from a Graduate Record Examination (GRE) test preparation book (Seltzer, 
2009). All were of moderate to high difficulty. Participants were told that they would gain one 
point for each correct answer and zero for an incorrect answer. Participants were also informed 
that upon completion of part 1, they will receive earnings which may depend on their relative 
performance in the test.21 
In part 2, participants were randomly and anonymously matched into groups consisting of 
3 participants. We chose 𝑛 = 3 for three important reasons. First, it allows us to minimize 
mistakes/errors of experimental participants by creating the simplest possible environment for 
them while still keeping it rich enough to incorporate all the important factors that might influence 
their behavior. Second, it provides a very strong test for the theory. For larger values of 𝑛, it would 
not be possible to see whether the model makes the correct prediction regarding the impact of the 
curvature of the utility function on the relationship between donations and the degree of waste. 
Finally, 𝑛 = 3 creates the hardest possible public good environment to observe a negative 
relationship between donations and the degree of waste.22 
Each group was randomly assigned to a different charity and participants in a given group 
could simultaneously donate any amount to this charity, ranging from $0 to the amount earned in 
part 1 with increments of 5 cents.23 In the Equal treatment, all members of the group received $30. 
In the Unequal treatment, participants who scored the best in part 1 received $45, participants in 
the middle received $30, and participants who scored the worst received $15. While the Equal 
treatment provides a simple environment to test our predictions, the Unequal treatment provides a 
relatively more realistic set-up to study our questions. It is important to stress that the focus of our 
                                                 
21 Specifically, participants were told that the amount earned “may be the same for everyone in this room or each 
participant’s earnings may depend on their relative performance in the test.” We used this language to facilitate 
comparison between our two treatments: Equal versus Unequal.  
22 As we will show in Section 5, the estimated net effect of the degree of waste on giving is negative. If the net effect 
was instead positive, then one might argue that the net effect could have changed in a larger group of people. But since 
the net effect is negative, what we observe here serves as a lower bound for a larger economy. 
23 We used the following charities: American Cancer Society, American Red Cross, Doctors Without Borders, Feeding 
America, Food for Poor, and Save the Children. 
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study is to look at the effects of different tax rates and degrees of waste on giving, but we will also 
be able to study how different initial income distributions might be affecting giving decisions.24 
After learning their earned income, all participants made their donations simultaneously. 
Participants knew that we would apply a tax (which was either 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75%) on each 
participant’s remaining income and collect the corresponding amount of money. They also knew 
that we would evenly redistribute a share of the collected money among the participants within the 
same group, while part of the collected money (which was either 0%, 50%, or 100%) would be 
returned back to the experimenter. To avoid negative framings, we did not use the word “waste” 
in the experiment.25 In our experiment, individual donations were anonymous.  
Participants were asked to make 10 donation decisions under different combinations of the 
tax rate and the redistribution rate, as shown in Table 1. In addition Tables C1 and C2, in Appendix 
C, give reader an idea of how contributions would look like under specific utility functions. At the 
very end of the experiment, the computer randomly implemented one decision for payment and 
applied the appropriate tax rate and the redistribution (waste) rate to compute the final income for 
each participant. Then the experimenter sent the check to each charity with the total amount 
donated to that charity.26 
In order to minimize calculation mistakes, participants were provided with a pre-
programmed "calculator”. A participant could enter the tax rate, redistribution rate and the possible 
donation decisions by themselves and the other participants in their groups. The calculator would 
then show the group donation, pre-tax income, tax payment, after-tax income, redistribution 
amount and the final income of the participant. Participants could use the calculator as many times 
as they like. 
In part 3, we elicited participants’ risk preferences in order to capture the curvature of their 
consumption utility which we use as an approximation for their elasticity of marginal utility. In a 
series of 15 binary choices, as shown in Table 2, participants were asked to choose between a risky 
option A ($9.0 or $1.0 with 50% chance each) and a safe option B (increasing monotonically from 
                                                 
24 If the set of contributors do not change across the Equal and Unequal treatments, then our model would predict that 
the level of public goods provision should be the same across treatments (distribution-neutrality result). Otherwise, 
the model predicts higher total contributions under the Unequal treatment. 
25 Instead of using the word “waste” we chose to use “redistribution rate” since it is more natural and it was easier to 
explain to participants. 
26 Participants were told that they could receive confirmation that we actually sent the check to the charity. Specifically, 
we said: “If you want to get a confirmation about your donation, please include your e-mail address in the sign out 
sheet and we will have the charity automatically email you the total amount of donation by your group.” 
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$0.5 to $7.5). One of the 15 choices was randomly selected to be paid out at the end of the 
experiment.27 Information collected in part 3 allows us to test our Hypothesis 2 in a controlled 
manner, since our elasticity condition capturing the curvature of the utility function, −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
, 
corresponds to the relative risk aversion coefficient in our risk elicitation task.28 As the curvature 
of the consumption utility increases, we expect individuals to choose a higher number of safe 
options. Therefore, by using the average relative risk aversion coefficient elicited from the data, 
we can test our Hypothesis 2: If individuals are not very risk-averse, then, for a given tax rate 𝑡, 
higher 𝑤 leads to higher donations; however, for highly risk-averse individuals, higher 𝑤 leads to 
lower donations. 
Finally, it is important to control for social preferences. In part 4, each participant was 
randomly matched with another participant. Participants were asked to choose one of the four 
options ($2.00; $2.00), ($1.75; $3.00), ($2.25; $1.00) and ($2.00; $1.75), where first entry 
corresponds to their own payoff and the second entry corresponds to their paired participants 
payoff. After both participants made their decisions, the computer randomly determined whose 
decision to implement, and the earnings of both participants were determined accordingly. 
At the end of the experiment, participants filled out a demographic questionnaire. Finally, 
after the computer displayed outcomes from all parts of the experiment and calculated individual 
earnings, participants received their payments in private. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. The Average Giving 
Table 3 shows the average giving and the fraction of participants giving $0 by treatment. 
The left panel corresponds to the Equal treatment in which all participants received $30 and could 
donate part of this income to a charity. The right panel corresponds to the Unequal treatment in 
which participants received $45, $30, or $15. Recall that the total amount of income is fixed across 
Equal and Unequal treatments ($30+$30+$30 versus $45+$30+$15). The only difference is the 
level of income a participant receives. On average, when there is no tax (i.e., 𝑡 = 0%) participants 
donate $3.69 to a given charity in the Equal treatment and $3.83 in the Unequal treatment. The 
                                                 
27 The parameters in this task were carefully designed in order to elicit a wide range of risk preferences. 
28 If agents have CRRA consumption utility functions, then −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
= 𝜃 
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difference is not statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum, p-value = 0.70). The case of 𝑡 = 0% 
is only for comparison purposes. When examining the effect of taxes and waste on giving, we only 
consider the case of 𝑡 > 0% since when 𝑡 = 0% waste is no longer a consideration for 
participants.29 
We begin by examining how giving changes when 𝑡 changes. In the Equal treatment, when 
participants know that there is no waste (i.e., 𝑤 = 0%), giving slightly increases from $3.97 when 
𝑡 = 25% to $4.06 when 𝑡 = 50% and it increases to $4.18 when 𝑡 = 75%. However, none of these 
differences are significant based on pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Looking at the effect of 
higher taxes on giving at 𝑤 = 50% and 𝑤 = 100%, we see first a decrease in giving and then an 
increase. While the first decrease at 𝑤 = 50% is significant at the 0.05 level, none of the other 
cases are significant. Pooling across all levels of waste, the left panel of Figure 1 shows no 
significant relationship between the average giving and the tax rate 𝑡 in the Equal treatment (none 
of the pair-wise comparisons are significant at the conventional statistical levels). 
Similar response to changes in the tax rate is observed when examining the Unequal 
treatment. When participants know that there is no waste (i.e., 𝑤 = 0%), giving slightly increases 
from $4.75 when 𝑡 = 25% to $4.90 when⁡𝑡 = 50% and it decreases to $4.57 when 𝑡 = 75%. 
However, these differences are not significant based on pair-wise Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
Similarly, for waste levels of 𝑤 = 50% and 𝑤 = 100%, there is no monotonic relationship between 
the tax rate and giving. The right panel of Figure 1 shows that the line representing the relationship 
between the average giving and the tax rate in the Unequal treatment is virtually flat, suggesting 
no significant correlation (none of the pair-wise comparisons are significant at the conventional 
statistical levels). 
Next, we examine how giving changes in 𝑤. In the Equal treatment, when participants 
know that instead of 𝑤 = 0% the degree of waste is 𝑤 = 50%, giving significantly decreases from 
$3.97 to $3.02 when 𝑡 = 25% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), from $4.06 to $2.53 
when 𝑡 = 50% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), and from $4.18 to $2.85 when 𝑡 = 
75% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01). When participants know that instead of 𝑤 = 
50% the degree of waste is 𝑤 = 100%, giving further decreases from $3.02 to $2.06 when 𝑡 = 
                                                 
29 Imposing an assumption that 𝑤 = 0% when 𝑡 = 0% is very restrictive and it may not be an accurate description of 
how participants perceive the case of 𝑡 = 0%. However, we also redid our analysis by imposing this assumption and 
the results did not change. These additional estimations are available upon request. 
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25% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), from $2.53 to $2.04 when 𝑡 = 50% (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), and from $2.85 to $2.58 when 𝑡 = 75% (Wilcoxon signed-rank 
test, p-value = 0.06). Pooling across all tax rates, the left panel of Figure 2 shows a clear negative 
and significant relationship between average giving and the degree of waste 𝑤 in the Equal 
treatment (all pair-wise comparisons are significant at the 0.01 level). 
Similar response to changes in waste is observed when examining the Unequal treatment. 
When participants know that instead of 𝑤 = 0% the degree of waste is 𝑤 = 50%, giving 
significantly decreases from $4.75 to $3.58 when 𝑡 = 25% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 
0.01), from $4.90 to $3.67 when 𝑡 = 50% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), and from 
$4.57 to $3.48 when 𝑡 = 75% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01). When participants 
know that instead of 𝑤 = 50% the degree of waste is 𝑤 = 100%, giving further decreases from 
$3.58 to $2.83 when 𝑡 = 25% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), from $3.67 to $2.85 
when 𝑡 = 50% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01), but it increases (although not 
significantly) from $3.48 to $4.25 when 𝑡 = 75% (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.12). The 
right panel of Figure 2 shows that there is a clear negative and significant relationship between 
average giving and the degree of waste in the Unequal treatment (all pair-wise comparisons are 
significant at the 0.01 level). 
To summarize, nonparametric tests show that, contrary to Hypothesis 1, giving does not 
change significantly when the tax rate changes. There are two competing explanations for why we 
did not find support for Hypothesis 1. First, it is possible that the elasticity of marginal utility is 
greater than 1 for our subject population.30 Second, the elasticity of marginal utility is less than 1 
but income loss is very salient for the subjects and, therefore, subjects weigh the income effect 
more heavily than predicted by a rational model. Independent of which explanation is correct, by 
providing a comparative analysis, we can provide a strong test of our model. Given that donations 
are not responsive of the tax rate, our model predicts that donations should decrease as the rate of 
waste increases. More formally, the theory predicts that the marginal effect of the tax rate on giving 
is greater than the marginal effect of the degree of waste on giving for any 0 < 𝑡 < 1 and 0 <
𝑤 < 1 (see Theorem 4 and Hypothesis 3). Consistent with Hypothesis 3, this is exactly what we 
see in the data: while the effect of the tax rate on giving is small and not significant, there is a 
                                                 
30 However, we later rule out this explanation based on our risk elicitation task that is used to approximate elasticity 
of marginal utility coefficients (assuming one can approximate elasticities with relative risk aversion coefficients). 
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strong negative relationship between the degree of waste and giving. Note that, our data is also 
consistent with Hypothesis 2, but nonparametric tests are not helpful in testing Hypothesis 2 
directly. Instead, we provide a direct test of Hypothesis 2 in Section 5.2.  
To check the robustness of our findings, we also provide a regression analysis.31 Table 4 
reports Tobit regressions with standard errors clustered at the participant level.32 The dependent 
variable is giving. Regression (1) uses the data from the Equal treatment, and the independent 
variables are the tax rate 𝑡 and the rate of waste 𝑤.33 Consistent with the non-parametric tests, the 
coefficient on 𝑡 is not significant (p-value = 0.68), suggesting that there is no relationship between 
giving and the tax rate. Also, consistent with the non-parametric tests, the coefficient on 𝑤 is 
negative and highly significant (p-value < 0.01), suggesting that giving decreases in the degree of 
waste. Regression (2) uses the data from the Unequal treatment, and the independent variables are 
the tax rate 𝑡, the rate of waste 𝑤, and Income (to control for the different income levels that 
participants earned in part 1 of the experiment). As in the Equal treatment (regression 1), the 
coefficient on 𝑡 is not significant (p-value = 0.96). Also, as in the Equal treatment, the coefficient 
on 𝑤 is negative and highly significant (p-value < 0.01). Pooling the data together, as shown in 
regression (3) in Table 4, corroborates this result. Another support for Hypothesis 3 comes from a 
simple Wald test which we conduct based on the estimation results presented in Table 4. We find 
that the coefficient on 𝑡 is significantly higher than the coefficient on 𝑤 (p-values in all 
specifications are less than 0.01). Additional robustness checks are provided in Appendix D (see 
Table D1). This leads us to our first result. 
Result 1: In the Equal and Unequal treatments, giving significantly decreases when the 
degree of waste 𝑤 increases, but it does not change when the tax rate 𝑡 increases. 
Regression (3) of Table 4 also gives us an opportunity to see how initial income inequality 
affects the level of contributions. Consistent with the distribution-neutrality theorem of Bergstrom 
et al. (1986), we find that the coefficient of the dummy variable Unequal is not significant, 
suggesting that initial income distribution does not matter for giving decisions. However, it 
                                                 
31 7 participants (3 in the Equal and 4 in the Unequal treatment) failed to submit their answers in part 1 on time in the 
earlier sessions (and thus received a score of zero in part 1). Our results are robust to inclusion or exclusion of these 
7 participants, and are available upon request from the authors.  
32 We choose to present Tobit regression analysis since roughly half of the participants give $0. Our qualitative results 
are robust to using other specifications such as OLS. 
33 We exclude the data for 𝑡 = 0% because for this part of the data it is not clear how to interpret 𝑤. However, 
qualitative results are very similar when we assume that 𝑤 = 0% for 𝑡 = 0% and include this data in estimation of 
Table 4. 
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important to note that while the theory makes correct qualitative prediction at the group level, it 
does not predict the levels of individual giving. While the model predicts that the high income 
individuals (who received $45) should contribute more than the middle income individuals (who 
received $30) and the middle income individuals should contribute more the low income 
individuals (who received $15), our regression analysis shows that this does not hold in the data. 
Although the Income coefficient in regressions (2) and (3) is positive, it is not significant. Also, 
see the additional analysis in Appendix D (see Table D2 and Table D3). However, this result is 
not that surprising given that many other studies find that the high income individuals under-
contribute while the low income individuals over-contribute (Chan et al., 1996, 1999; Uler, 2011; 
Maurice et al., 2013). 
 
5.2. The Curvature of the Utility Function 
Recall that one of the theoretical predictions of our model is that the relationship between 
giving and the degree of waste depends on the curvature of the utility function (or more formally 
the elasticity of the marginal utility).34 In particular, Theorem 2 predicts that if the elasticity of 
marginal utility is less than or equal to 1/3, then giving is an increasing function of the degree of 
waste. Theorem 3 states that if individuals have CRRA preferences and the relative risk aversion 
coefficient satisfies 𝜃 >
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
, then giving should decrease when the degree of waste increases.35 
To elicit the curvature of the utility function, we used a series of 15 binary lottery choices, 
as shown in Table 2. The relative degree of risk aversion, and thus the degree of curvature of the 
consumption utility, is determined by the number of safe choices. Risk-averse participants should 
choose 7 or more safe choices, while risk-neutral or risk-seeking participants should choose 6 safe 
choices or less.36 
We find that the average number of safe choices is 7.20 with a standard deviation of 1.84. 
Assuming a CRRA utility function, seven safe choices corresponds to a relative risk aversion 
coefficient 𝜃 to be in a range between 0.26 and 0.50 and eight corresponds to the relative risk 
aversion coefficient 𝜃 to be in a range between 0.50 and 0.74. As an example, a CRRA utility 
                                                 
34 The relationship between giving and the tax rate also changes sign with the degree of relative risk aversion, but only 
for extremely high (not observed in practice) risk aversion degrees. 
35 When the parameters of the experiment are used, that threshold varies between 0.33 and 0.67 depending on the rate 
of waste and tax. 
36 If an agent picks 6 safe choices we cannot identify whether he is risk-neutral or whether he is slightly risk-averse.  
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function with a relative risk aversion parameter 𝜃 = 0.5 would be consistent with observing 7 or 
8 safe choices in the risk elicitation task and it would also be consistent with decreasing donations 
as the degree of waste decreases. 
Next, we examine whether individuals with different risk preferences behave differently as 
𝑡 and 𝑤 changes. While our theory does not directly address heterogeneity, under the assumption 
that individuals expect other individuals to be similar to them, we can rely on the current model to 
derive approximate predictions regarding their giving behavior.37 We conjecture that individuals 
who are risk averse would on average decrease their giving, while individuals who are not risk 
averse would on average increase their giving. 
To see if our conjecture is valid, we split our sample into two broad categories based on 
whether participants are risk-averse or not, and estimate the response of giving to changes in 𝑡 and 
𝑤 separately for each category.38 Table 5 reports the same regressions as in Table 4, splitting our 
data based on whether participants are risk-averse (regressions 1, 2, and 3) or not (regressions 4, 
5, and 6).39 Regressions (1), (2) and (3) replicate our estimation results reported in Table 4, 
implying that for risk-averse participants giving decreases in the rate of waste 𝑤. Regressions (4), 
(5) and (6), however, show that the magnitude and the significance of this relationship are greatly 
reduced when we use risk-neutral and risk-seeking participants. These results are consistent with 
the interpretation that risk aversion (measuring the curvature of the utility function) moderates the 
effect of the degree of waste on giving. This leads us to our second result. 
Result 2: The relationship between giving and the degree of waste 𝑤 is moderated by the 
curvature in the consumption utility. 
Recall that our model predicts that when 𝑤 increases, more risk-averse participants should 
decrease their giving and less risk-averse participants should increase their giving, but risk 
aversion should not play a role in the relationship between giving and the tax rate 𝑡. Our data 
                                                 
37 For example, there is a large literature in psychology and recently economics that individuals demonstrate a false 
consensus bias which implies even when actual preferences are heterogeneous, individuals may not realize that and 
they may be considering a relatively homogeneous environment. See Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Charness and 
Grosskopf (2001) for a review of this literature. 
38 When we say “not risk averse”, we simply mean this participant has chosen at most 6 safe choices. There is still a 
possibility that this participant is slightly risk-averse. Note that our theory predicts individuals with slight degree of 
risk aversion would behave in the same way as individuals who are risk-neutral or risk loving and, therefore, it makes 
sense to place these participants into the same group. 
39 One participant in our experiment has missing data after part 2 due to health reasons. Therefore, when we add 
variables from part 3, 4, and questionnaires to the regression analysis, this participant gets automatically dropped from 
the regression analysis. 
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provide partial support for the theory since it is mainly risk-averse individuals who decrease their 
giving when 𝑤 increases.40 In Appendix D, we provide additional robustness checks (see Table 
D4).  
In Section 5.4, we provide an alternative test of the model at the individual level allowing 
for heterogeneity among subjects. Our analysis in Section 5.4 does not depend on the risk 
elicitation task or the elasticity of marginal utility coefficients. Before we explain the test, we first 
provide some evidence of heterogeneity in Section 5.3. 
 
5.3. Individual Giving in Response to Changes in 𝒕 and 𝒘  
Although we find that, on average, giving decreases in the degree of waste and it does not 
change in the tax rate, there is substantial heterogeneity when examining individual behavior. 
Table 6 shows how different participants change their giving in response to changes in 𝑡 and 𝑤. 
We categorize each individual by two dimensions: (i) how they respond to changes in 𝑡 and (ii) 
how they respond to changes in 𝑤. We combine the data from the Equal and Unequal treatments. 
In Appendix D, we show that our results are similar when splitting the data by each treatment (see 
Table D5 and Table D6). 
Table 6 shows that there are three main types of individuals that account for more than half 
of all observations (112/204). First, there are 56 participants who always give $0 disregarding 𝑡 
and 𝑤. Second, there are 38 participants who weakly decrease their giving in response to increase 
of 𝑡 and 𝑤. Third, there are 18 participants who always give the same amount independent of 𝑡 
and⁡𝑤. Summing over each category, we see that most common types of individuals are those who 
decrease their giving when 𝑤 increases (75 participants), those who always give $0 (56 
participants), and those who decrease their giving when 𝑡 increases (49 participants). This leads 
us to our third result. 
Result 3: There is substantial heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in 𝑡 and 
𝑤. The most common types of individuals are those who (i) donate less when the degree of waste 
increases, (ii) donate less when the tax rate increases, and (iii) always give $0.  
 
  
                                                 
40 In Section 6 we highlight some behavioral factors that might explain the discrepancy between theoretical predictions 
and behavior. 
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5.4. Additional Support for the Model 
In this section, based on Theorem 4, we provide an alternative way of testing the model 
that does not rely on the relative risk aversion coefficients and does not depend on the assumption 
of elasticity being less than 1 as assumed in Hypothesis 1.41 The difference from our previous 
analysis regarding Hypothesis 3 is that here we test the model at the individual level. If we assume 
that participants believe others to have similar preferences, then we can provide additional 
hypotheses for our model at the individual level:  
Hypothesis 4: Individuals who decrease their giving when the tax rate increases should 
also decrease their giving when the degree of waste increases. 
Hypothesis 5: Individuals who increase their giving when the tax rate increases, may 
increase or decrease their giving when the degree of waste increases.  
Note that these two hypotheses are consistent with our individual data analysis reported in 
Table 6. Not including the participants with inconsistent choices, we see that out of 41 participants 
who consistently decrease their giving when the tax rate increases, 38 of them also decrease their 
giving when the degree of waste increases. However, among 24 participants who increase their 
giving when the tax rate increases, only 13 participants consistently increase their giving when the 
degree of waste increases, while 11 participants consistently decrease their giving when the degree 
of waste increases. 
 
5.5. Determinants of Giving 
In this section we examine the determinants of giving. Table 7 reports the Tobit 
regressions, in which the dependent variable is giving, and the independent variables are the 
variables used in the estimation of Table 4 and Table 5. For comparison purposes, regression (1) 
in Table 7 is the same as regression (3) in Table 4. 
Regression (2) in Table 7 uses two additional explanatory variables Egalitarian and 
Generous (these variables correspond to the distributional choices participants made in part 4 of 
our experiment). Note that the estimated coefficients on 𝑤 and 𝑡 in regression (2) are fairly similar 
to those in regression (1). In addition, we find that participants who are classified as Generous give 
                                                 
41 It is possible that the elasticity of consumption utility coefficient may not be well captured by the relative risk 
aversion coefficient if agents are not expected utility maximizers or if the risk elicitation task used in the study does 
not correctly capture risk preferences. 
23 
 
more to charity (p-value < 0.01). Regression (3) adds other variables which we elicited at the end 
of the experiment using a survey. The positive and significant coefficient on Female suggests that 
on average women give more than men (p-value < 0.01). Finally, regression (4) adds an additional 
control for the participant’s score in part 1. Importantly, none of these controls changes our main 
qualitative results. 
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
We provide a theoretical model and conduct a laboratory experiment with actual charitable 
donations to study how taxes impact individual giving. The theory shows that the relationship 
between charitable giving and the tax rate is positive. However, donations may increase or decrease 
when the rate of waste increases depending on the elasticity of marginal utility. In addition, the 
model predicts that the marginal effect of the tax rate on giving is greater than the marginal effect 
of the degree of waste on giving.  Our experimental results show that changes in the tax rate 𝑡 have 
a weak and insignificant effect on giving. Consistent with the theoretical predictions, the degree 
of waste 𝑤 has a negative and highly significant effect on giving, and the relationship between 
giving and 𝑤 is moderated by the elasticity of marginal utility. Moreover, the data provide strong 
qualitative support for the model regarding the differential effects of tax rate and waste on 
donations.  
An interesting question emerging from our experimental findings is why individuals have 
a strong negative reaction to an increase in the degree of waste, while they have a weak reaction 
to an increase in the tax rate. After all, both higher tax rates and higher waste decrease the price of 
giving, creating a positive substitution effect. Our model is capable of explaining the differential 
effects of the tax rate and rate of waste, since it demonstrates that tax rate and waste create different 
effects on prices (opportunity cost of giving). The effect of an increase in the tax rate on the price 
of giving is significantly stronger than the effect of an increase in the rate of waste on the price of 
giving, as we show in Section 3. We further show in Section 3 that income effects created by tax 
rate changes and level of waste changes are similar. Therefore, while the substitution effect offsets 
the income effect when the tax rate increases, the substitution effect is not strong enough to offset 
the income effect when the degree of waste increases. Of course, there may also be other behavioral 
factors not considered in the model that reinforce our results. Income losses may be very salient 
for the subjects, which would imply the income effect to be more heavily weighted in subjects’ 
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decisions. Or, participants may experience negative feelings, such as anger, since the experimenter 
is “wasting” money they rightfully earned in the experiment, which may then lead to lower altruism 
towards charitable causes.42 In summary, our experimental design is capable of providing strong 
qualitative evidence for the model as well as highlighting additional behavioral motives that arise 
in experiments. 
Since our results imply that the average effect of “waste” on donations is negative on large 
economies, we conjecture that policies decreasing the transaction costs related to taxation are 
likely to increase charitable donations. Similarly, donations are likely to increase if individuals 
perceive tax revenue to be spent on services they value rather than things they do not care for. 
Silverman et al. (2014) argue that individuals evade taxes less if they are given a legitimate 
explanation for being taxed. Similarly, our results suggest that it might be worthwhile to make an 
effort to convince individuals that their taxes are being efficiently used for public services. Finally, 
our results imply that empirical studies estimating price and income elasticities of giving would 
benefit by controlling for the confounding effect of perception about wasteful government 
spending since perceptions regarding waste might exogenously or endogenously change over time.  
 
  
                                                 
42 In addition, negative emotions towards taxation could explain why we do not see a positive effect of the tax rate on 
giving as predicted by the model. 
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Table 1: Donation decisions in the experiment 
Decision line Tax rate, 𝑡  Waste, 𝑤 
1 0% N/A 
2 25% 0% 
3 50% 0% 
4 75% 0% 
5 25% 50% 
6 50% 50% 
7 75% 50% 
8 25% 100% 
9 50% 100% 
10 75% 100% 
Participants choose how much to donate 
given the tax rate and the waste rate. 
 
 
Table 2: Elicitation of risk preferences 
Choice Option A (risky option) Option B (safe option) 
1 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $0.50 for sure 
2 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $1.00 for sure 
3 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $1.50 for sure 
4 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $2.00 for sure 
5 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $2.50 for sure 
6 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $3.00 for sure 
7 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $3.50 for sure 
8 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $4.00 for sure 
9 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $4.50 for sure 
10 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $5.00 for sure 
11 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $5.50 for sure 
12 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $6.00 for sure 
13 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $6.50 for sure 
14 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $7.00 for sure 
15 $9.00 or $1.00 with 50% chance $7.50 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky Option A ($9.0 or $1.00 with 
50% chance each) or a safe Option B (a certain amount for sure). 
 
 
Table 3: Giving by treatment 
Treatment Equal Unequal 
Tax rate, 𝑡 Waste, 𝑤 Average giving Fraction of $0 Average giving Fraction of $0 
0% N/A $3.69 (0.52) 0.50 $3.83 (0.64) 0.50 
25% 0% $3.97 (0.57) 0.46 $4.75 (0.65) 0.39 
50% 0% $4.06 (0.55) 0.44 $4.90 (0.66) 0.39 
75% 0% $4.18 (0.59) 0.46 $4.57 (0.66) 0.39 
25% 50% $3.02 (0.44) 0.47 $3.58 (0.51) 0.43 
50% 50% $2.53 (0.39) 0.50 $3.67 (0.60) 0.46 
75% 50% $2.85 (0.54) 0.52 $3.48 (0.61) 0.50 
25% 100% $2.06 (0.38) 0.61 $2.83 (0.54) 0.56 
50% 100% $2.04 (0.45) 0.67 $2.85 (0.58) 0.58 
75% 100% $2.58 (0.60) 0.70 $4.25 (0.93) 0.61 
 Standard error of the mean is in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) 
𝑡  -0.46 -0.07 -0.27 
  [tax rate] (1.11) (1.23) (0.85) 
𝑤  -4.26*** -3.92*** -4.13*** 
  [degree of waste] (1.05) (1.12) (0.79) 
Income  0.02 0.03 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.08) (0.08) 
Unequal   1.66 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (1.33) 
Constant 1.47 0.95 -0.30 
  [constant term] (1.22) (2.49) (2.79) 
Observations 810 1026 1836 
Clusters 90 114 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 
level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
 
 
Table 5: Giving and the curvature of the utility function 
 Risk-averse participants Risk-neutral/seeking participants  
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
𝑡  -0.93 -1.98 -1.59 -0.29 4.00 1.85 
  [tax rate] (1.29) (1.15) (0.86) (1.90) (2.76) (1.77) 
𝑤  -5.81*** -5.05*** -5.40*** -2.46* -1.56 -2.09 
  [degree of waste] (1.60) (1.41) (1.08) (1.16) (1.91) (1.15) 
Income  0.08 0.08  -0.10 -0.07 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.11) (0.11)  (0.13) (0.12) 
Unequal   1.00   3.06 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (1.70)   (2.16) 
Constant 3.13* 1.09 0.27 -0.20 0.92 -0.87 
  [constant term] (1.46) (3.09) (3.65) (2.03) (4.46) (4.41) 
Observations 450 675 1125 351 351 702 
Clusters 50 75 125 39 39 78 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
 
 
Table 6: Individual giving in response to changes in 𝒕 and 𝒘 
Giving response 
to changes in the 
tax rate 𝑡 
Giving response  
to changes in the degree of waste 𝑤 
Zero giving  Constant Decreasing Increasing Other Total 
Zero giving 56 0 0 0 0 56 
Constant 0 18 13 2 0 33 
Decreasing 0 1 38 2 8 49 
Increasing 0 0 11 13 6 30 
Other 0 0 13 0 23 36 
Total 56 19 75 17 37 204 
Each number in the table indicates the number of participants that fall into one of the categories. For 
example, there are 38 participants whose giving decreases in 𝑡 and in 𝑤. 
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Table 7: The determinants of giving 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) (4) 
𝑡  -0.27 -0.33 -0.25 -0.27 
  [tax rate] (0.85) (0.85) (0.84) (0.86) 
𝑤  -4.13*** -4.14*** -4.08*** -4.16*** 
  [degree of waste] (0.79) (0.79) (0.76) (0.78) 
Income 0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
  [income = $15, $30, $45] (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Unequal 1.66 1.60 1.83 1.43 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment] (1.33) (1.27) (1.17) (1.16) 
Egalitarian   2.76 1.81 1.83 
  [1 if ($2.00; $2.00)]  (1.82) (1.68) (1.70) 
Generous   7.71** 7.92** 7.86** 
  [1 if ($1.75; $3.00)]  (2.78) (2.41) (2.45) 
Hardwork    -0.53 -0.52 
  [how hard you worked in part 1]   (0.28) (0.27) 
Female    3.89** 3.89** 
  [1 if female]   (1.41) (1.40) 
Family income   0.13 0.22 
  [family income]   (0.32) (0.32) 
Right-wing   0.78 0.71 
  [right-wing political view]   (0.54) (0.56) 
Unnecessary   -3.63 -3.04 
  [1 if taxes are annoying and unnecessary]   (2.27) (2.30) 
Necessary   0.13 1.53 
  [1 if taxes are necessary and do not bother]   (2.60) (2.68) 
Reputation   0.01 -0.11 
  [importance of own reputation]   (0.39) (0.40) 
Church   0.72 0.61 
  [giving to church]   (0.39) (0.39) 
Charity   0.44 0.5 
  [giving to charities]   (0.50) (0.51) 
Familiar    0.30 0.28 
  [knowledge of charity]   (0.24) (0.24) 
American   -0.41 -0.34 
  [1 if a United States citizen]   (1.56) (1.58) 
Part 1     0.13 
  [part 1 score]    (0.35) 
Constant -0.30 -1.84 -7.43 -7.45 
  [constant term] (2.79) (3.06) (5.46) (5.40) 
Observations 1836 1827 1827 1764 
Clusters 204 203 203 196 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 level. Standard errors in 
parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Figure 1: Average giving in response to changes in 𝒕 by treatment 
   
 
Figure 2: Average giving in response to changes in 𝒘 by treatment 
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Appendix A (For Online Publication) – Proofs for Section 3 
We start by writing the maximization problem of an agent 𝑖: 
max
𝑐𝑖,𝑔𝑖
𝑢(𝑐𝑖) + 𝑣(𝐺)  
s.t. 𝑐𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤)
𝑡 ∑ (𝑦𝑗−𝑔𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
 and 𝑔𝑖 ≥ 0. 
Assuming an interior solution, the first order condition is 
𝑢′ ((1 − 𝑡)(𝑦𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖) + (1 − 𝑤)
𝑡 ∑ (𝑦𝑗−𝑔𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
𝑛
)(1 − (1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
) 𝑡) = 𝑣′(𝐺). 
Since this equation holds for all agents, in equilibrium, the following should hold: 
𝑦𝑖 − 𝑔𝑖 = 𝑦𝑘 − 𝑔𝑘 =
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
. 
Therefore, the FOC simplifies to: 
𝑢′ ((1 − 𝑤𝑡) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)) (1 − (1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
) 𝑡) = 𝑣′(𝐺). 
Proof for Theorem 1: Totally differentiating the FOC with respect to the tax rate 𝑡, and 
then solving for 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
, we get 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
= −
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤(
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)+𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎
𝑣′′(𝐺)+𝑢′′(𝑏)(
1−𝑤𝑡
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)
, 
where 𝑎 = 1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
 and 𝑏 = (1 − 𝑤𝑡) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
). Since the denominator is always negative, the sign 
of the numerator determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺 with respect to 𝑡.  
 If 𝑤 = 0, the numerator simplifies to 𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎 and it is easy to see that it is always positive 
and therefore, we do not need any additional assumptions about the consumption utility.  
Now assume 0 < 𝑤 < 1. Note that 𝑎 = 1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
=
𝑛−1+𝑤
𝑛
> 𝑤. Hence,  
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎 >  
> 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)𝑤 =  
= 𝑤 (𝑢′′(𝑏) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)). 
Since (1 − 𝑎𝑡) < (1 − 𝑤𝑡), we can show that  
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎 > ⁡𝑤(𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏 + 𝑢′(𝑏)). 
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This implies that if 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏 + 𝑢′(𝑏) is nonnegative, 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎 has to be 
positive. In other words, for the numerator to be positive, we need −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
≤ 1. 
Finally, if 𝑤 = 1, total public goods provision is still a strictly increasing function of the 
tax rate if −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
< 1. For the extreme case of 𝑤 = 1 and −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
= 1, public goods provision 
does not change with the tax rate. 
Proof for Theorem 2: Totally differentiating the FOC with respect to the rate of waste, 
and then solving for 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
, we get 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
= −
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡(
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)+𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
𝑣′′(𝐺)+𝑢′′(𝑏)(
1−𝑤𝑡
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)
. 
where 𝑎 = 1 −
1−𝑤
𝑛
 and 𝑏 = (1 − 𝑤𝑡) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
). Since the denominator is always negative, the sign 
of the numerator determines the sign of the partial derivative of 𝐺 with respect to w.  
When 𝑡 = 0, waste does not matter, so we consider 0 < 𝑡 ≤ 1. Since (1 − 𝑎𝑡) < (1 − 𝑤𝑡) 
and 𝑢′′(𝑏) < 0, we get 
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
>  
> 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑤𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
=  
= 𝑡 (𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏 + 𝑢′(𝑏)
1
𝑛
).  
This implies that if 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏 + 𝑢′(𝑏)
1
𝑛
 is nonnegative, then 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) +
𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
> 0. Therefore, the condition needed is −
𝑢′′(𝑥)𝑥
𝑢′(𝑥)
≤
1
𝑛
. 
Proof for Theorem 3: Assume the agents’ consumption preferences are defined by the 
CRRA utility function 𝑢 =
𝑥(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)
 for 𝜃 ≠ 1 and 𝑢 = ln⁡(𝑥) for 𝜃 = 1. Then the elasticity of 
marginal utility is given by 𝜃. We need to find the condition for donations to strictly decrease when 
the degree of waste increases. In other words, we need the condition that makes 
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
< 0. Substituting 𝑢 =
𝑥(1−𝜃)
(1−𝜃)
 in the previous equation, we get 
−𝜃𝑏−𝜃−1𝑡 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑏−𝜃
𝑡
𝑛
< 0. 
Rearranging, this equation simplifies to 
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𝜃 >
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
. 
It is important to note that 
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
>
1
𝑛
 for 𝑤 < 1, since (1 − 𝑎𝑡) < (1 − 𝑤𝑡). However, 
for 𝑤 = 1, 
(1−𝑤𝑡)
(1−𝑎𝑡)𝑛
=
1
𝑛
. 
Proof for Theorem 4: We provide a proof by contradiction. Suppose 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
>
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
. Then the 
following needs to hold: 
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑤 (
𝑌 − 𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)𝑎 < 
< 𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑡 (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡) + 𝑢′(𝑏)
𝑡
𝑛
. 
Rearranging, 
𝑢′(𝑏)(𝑎 −
𝑡
𝑛
) < 𝑢′′(𝑏) (
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
) (1 − 𝑎𝑡)(𝑡 − 𝑤). 
We can immediately see that if 𝑡 ≥ 𝑤, then the previous inequality cannot hold. Instead, let’s 
assume 𝑡 < 𝑤. Rearranging one more time, we get 
𝑎−
𝑡
𝑛
𝑤−𝑡
< −
𝑢′′(𝑏)(
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)
𝑢′(𝑏)
. 
Note that 𝑛 <
𝑎−
𝑡
𝑛
𝑤−𝑡
 and −
𝑢′′(𝑏)(
𝑌−𝐺
𝑛
)(1−𝑎𝑡)
𝑢′(𝑏)
< −
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏
𝑢′(𝑏)
. However, we assumed that 
−
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏
𝑢′(𝑏)
≤ 𝑛. Hence, we arrive at a contradiction. If −
𝑢′′(𝑏)𝑏
𝑢′(𝑏)
≤ 𝑛, then 
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑡
>
𝜕𝐺
𝜕𝑤
. 
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Appendix B (For Online Publication) – Instructions for the Unequal Treatment 
Instructions 
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this experiment. Your participation is voluntary. In this experiment 
we want to see the choices that people make. You will be making choices on your own and in private. So it is very 
important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s choices. If you have any questions, please raise your 
hand. 
The experiment will proceed in four parts. At the beginning of each part you will receive detailed instructions 
for that part. The earnings that you make will depend on your decisions in each part. 
In Part 1, you will take a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 questions. Upon completion of Part 1 you 
will earn a certain amount of money. This amount may be the same for everyone in this room or each participant’s 
earnings may depend on their relative performance in the test. 
In Part 2, you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. Depending on your choices and 
chance, you may lose part of the money you earn in Part 1. Your decisions in Part 2 will not affect your earnings from 
Part 3 and Part 4. 
In Part 3, you will be asked to make another series of choices in decision problems. How much money you 
receive in Part 3 will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
In Part 4, you will be asked to make one last choice in a decision problem. Again, your decisions from 
preceding Part 2 and Part 3 will not affect your earnings in Part 4. 
In addition, upon completion of the experiment, you will receive a show-up reward of $5. This is yours to 
keep regardless of the decisions you make in the experiment. After you complete the experiment, you will be asked 
to fill out a questionnaire while you wait to be paid. 
Your computer has been assigned an ID number that you will be informed of. Your decisions and payoffs 
from the experiment will be recorded with that ID number. At no time your name will be linked to that ID number. At 
the end of the experiment, you will be paid in private. Your decisions and payoff will not be revealed to anyone during 
or after the experiment. 
Please turn off your cell phones now to avoid any interruption during the experiment. 
 
Part 1 – Cognitive Test 
You will now take a 20-minute cognitive test containing 10 questions. You may use the margins of this 
booklet to work out your answer if needed. You may ONLY use pencil and paper provided. No other aids are 
permitted. All questions have the following format: 
Who is the current President of the United States? 
A. Mitt Romney 
B. Bill Clinton 
C. Barack Obama 
D. George W. Bush 
E. David Cameron 
To correctly answer this example question, you would select C. You will gain one point for each correct answer and 
zero for an incorrect answer. Try to get as many points as you can. Upon completion of Part 1 you will earn a certain 
amount of money. This amount may be the same for everyone in this room or each participant’s earnings may depend 
on their relative performance in the test.  
You will have 20 minutes to work on the test. You may not be able to finish all the questions in this time.  
 
Part 2 – Donation to a Charity 
In Part 2 of the experiment you will be randomly and anonymously matched into a group which consists 
of 3 participants. Based on the performance on the cognitive test in Part 1, all participants in your group will be 
ranked, and the highest ranked participant will earn $45, the middle ranked participant will earn $30, and the 
lowest ranked participant will earn $15. Then, each participant in your group (including you) will have an 
opportunity to donate to the same charity. However, each group will be randomly assigned to a different charity. 
When Part 2 starts, the name of the charity that your group is assigned to will be given to you on the computer 
screen. You can donate any amount to this charity from $0 to the amount earned with increments of 5 cents. The 
amount you donate will be deducted from the amount you earned. We will write a check in the total amount that 
you as well as the other participants in your group chose to donate and send it to the charity (If you want to get a 
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confirmation about your donation, please include your e-mail address in the sign out sheet and we will have the charity 
automatically email you the total amount of donation by your group). 
Here are several examples: 
 The numbers in this example are only for demonstration purposes. 
 Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1.  
 If you donate $0 and 0 cents to the charity then your remaining income is $30.  
 If you donate $15 and 45 cents to the charity then your remaining income is $14 and 55 cents.  
 If you donate $30 to the charity then your remaining income is $0.  
You and the other members of your group will make donations simultaneously. You will learn your group’s 
total donation to the charity only at the very end of the experiment.  
After all three participants in your group make their donations, we will apply a tax rate of x% (which can 
be either 0%, 25%, 50%, or 75%) on each participant’s remaining income and collect the corresponding amount of 
money. Then we will evenly redistribute y% (which can be either 0%, 50%, or 100%) of the collected money among 
the participants of your group (including you).  
Here is an example: 
 The numbers in this example are only for demonstration purposes. 
 Assume that the tax rate is 25% and the redistribution rate is 50%.  
 Next, assume that based on the performance on the cognitive test in Part 1, participant 1 was ranked 3rd 
earning $15, participant 2 was ranked 2nd earning $30, and participant 3 was ranked 1st earning $45 (see 
column 2 in the table below).  
 Also, assume that participant 1 donated $10 to the charity, participant 2 donated $0, and participant 3 donated 
$20 (see column 3 in the table below).  
 Therefore, we will send a check for $30 ($10 + $0 + $20) to the charity.  
 Then, on each participant’s remaining pre-tax income (see column 4), we will apply a tax rate of 25% (see 
column 5), collecting $1.25 from participant 1, $7.5 from participant 2, and $6.25 from participant 3 ($1.25 
+ $7.5 + $6.25, for a total $15). So, after tax participant 1 will have $3.75 remaining (since participant 1 
donated $10 and there was a tax of 25% on the remaining $5, leaving participant 1 with $3.75). Similarly, 
participant 2’s and 3’s remaining after-tax income will be $22.5 and $18.75, respectively (see column 6).  
 Then, 50% of the total amount of $15, collected as taxes from all three participants, will be evenly 
redistributed among the three participants. Therefore, each participant will receive a redistribution amount of 
$2.5 (0.5×$15 divided by 3).  
 So, the final income of each participant (see column 8) will be the sum of the after-tax income (see column 
6) and the redistribution amount (see column 7). In this example only 50% of the collected taxes were 
redistributed back. The amount that has not been redistributed goes back to the experimenter, and not 
to the charity. 
Table 1 
(tax rate = 25% and redistribution rate = 50%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Participant Initial 
income 
Charity 
donation 
Pre-tax 
income, 
(2) - (3) 
Tax, 
(4)×25% 
After-tax 
income, 
(4) - (5) 
Redistribution 
amount, 
0.5×Total(5)/3 
Final 
income, 
(6) + (7) 
1 $15 $10 $5 $1.25 $3.75 $2.5 $6.25 
2 $30 $0 $30 $7.5 $22.5 $2.5 $25 
3 $45 $20 $25 $6.25 $18.75 $2.5 $21.25 
Total $90 $30 $60 $15 $45 $7.5 $52.5 
 
We will ask you to make 10 decisions of how much you would like to donate to the assigned charity under 
different combinations of the tax rate and the redistribution rate. Specifically, on your computer screen you will see 
a table with 10 lines (also as shown below). In each line you will state how much you would like to donate to the 
charity. You should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line will be the 
‘line that counts’ and will be implemented. 
When tax rate is 0%, no tax will be collected. Therefore, your final income is simply equal to your pre-tax 
income (initial income – donations to charity). When tax rate is not 0%, your final income may be lower or higher 
than your pre-tax income depending on the tax rate, redistribution rate and the donation decisions of group members.  
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Table 2 
Decision 
Line 
Tax rate Redistribution rate 
How much would you like to 
donate to the charity? 
1 0% N/A  
2 25% 100%  
3 50% 100%  
4 75% 100%  
5 25% 50%  
6 50% 50%  
7 75% 50%  
8 25% 0%  
9 50% 0%  
10 75% 0%  
 
To facilitate your decisions, we will provide a "calculator”. You may use the calculator to see your final 
income for any potential donation plans you have in mind before actually making the donation decision. To use the 
calculator, first enter the tax rate, redistribution rate and the possible donation decisions by you and the other 
participants in your group. The calculator will then fill in the numbers in Table 1 for you. You can use the calculator 
as many times as you like. 
At the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly draw one line for payment. We will implement the 
choices of each participant made in that line and will send the contributed amount to the charity. Also, we will apply 
the appropriate tax rate and the redistribution rate to compute final income for each participant. You will learn which 
line was drawn, your earnings corresponding to that line and your group’s total donation to the charity at the very end 
of the experiment.  
Your decisions in Part 2 do not have any effect on your earnings in Part 3 or Part 4. 
 
An Understanding Check: (All participants need to pass this before the decision making part of the experiment) 
1. Suppose you contribute $15 to your group’s assigned charity, and the other group members contributed $5 
and $10. How much money will the experimenter send to this charity on behalf of your group? Answer: $30 
2. Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1. Suppose you contribute $10 to your group’s 
assigned charity, what is your pre-tax income? Answer: $20 
3. Suppose you have earned $30 upon completion of Part 1. Suppose you contribute $10 to your group’s 
assigned charity, and the tax rate is 50%, what is your after-tax income? Answer: $10 
4. Suppose the total amount of taxes collected from your group is $30 and the redistribution rate is 50%, then 
how much money will you get back? Answer: $5 
5. If your after-tax income is $10 and if you also receive $5 back from the redistribution of tax revenue, what 
is your final income? Answer: $15 
 
Part 3 – 15 Decision Problems 
In Part 3 of the experiment, you will be asked to make choices in 15 decision problems. How much money 
you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
On your computer screen you will see a table with 15 lines (as shown below). In each line you will state 
whether you prefer Option A or Option B. Option A always offers a 50% chance to get $9 and a 50% chance to get 
$1, while Option B always offers a certain amount for sure (between $0.50 and $7.50, depending on the line). You 
should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line will be the ‘line that 
counts’ and will be paid out.  
At the end of the experiment, for each participant, the computer will randomly draw one line for payment. 
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose A in that line, then the computer 
will randomly choose either $9 or $1 with equal chances as your payment. If you chose B in that line, then you will 
receive for sure the exact amount that is specified by Option B in that line. 
Your decisions in Part 3 do not have any effect on your earnings in Part 4. The actual earnings for this part 
will be determined at the end of Part 4. 
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Table 1 
Decision 
Line 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.00 for sure 
7 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.50 for sure 
12 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $9.00 with 50% chance $1.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3, ,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12
,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.50 for sure  
 
Part 4 – One Decision Problem 
In Part 4 of the experiment, you will be randomly matched with another participant in this room. Nobody 
will ever learn whom they were matched with. You will be asked to choose between the following four options: 
Option 1: You will receive $2.00 and your paired participant will receive $2.00. 
Option 2: You will receive $1.75 and your paired participant will receive $3.00. 
Option 3: You will receive $2.25 and your paired participant will receive $1.00. 
Option 4: You will receive $2.00 and your paired participant will receive $1.75. 
Similarly your paired participant will decide between these four options.  
After you and the other participant make your decisions, the computer will also randomly determine whose 
decision to implement. If the computer chooses your decision to implement, then the earnings to you and the other 
participant will be determined according to your choice. If the computer chooses the other participant decision to 
implement, then the earnings will determined according to the other participant choice. 
The actual earnings for this part will be determined after everyone makes their decisions. 
 
Part 5 – Questionnaire 
 
1. How hard did you work in the first part of the experiment in a scale from 1 to 10 where 1 indicates little work and 
10 indicates extremely hard work. 
 
2. What is your gender? 
a) male 
b) female 
 
3. What is your age in years? 
 
4. What is your major? 
 
5. Family income: 
a) less than 50,000 
b) between 50,000 and 75,000 
c) between 75,000 and 100,000 
d) between 100,000 and 150,000 
e) between 150,000 and 200,000 
f) more than 200,000 
 
6. What proportion of your own income comes from your own work? 
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a) less than 20% 
b) between 20% and 50% 
c) between 50% and 70%  
d) more than 70% 
 
7. What is the importance of religion in your life? 
a) extremely important 
b) very important 
c) important  
d) somewhat important 
e) not very important 
f) not important at all 
 
8. In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking? 
a) extreme left 
b) left 
c) left-center 
d) center 
e) right-center 
f) right 
g) extreme right 
 
9. How would you place your views on this: “Hard work doesn´t bring success - it´s more a matter of luck and 
connections” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree 
f) I disagree most of the times 
g) I completely disagree 
 
10. Which of the following statements do you agree with the most? 
a) Income taxes are annoying and mostly unnecessary 
b) Income taxes are annoying but necessary 
c) Income taxes are necessary and do not bother me 
 
11. How would you place your views on this: “It is very annoying if the tax revenues are used for things I do not 
care for.” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree  
d) I am indifferent  
e) I disagree  
f) I disagree most of the times  
g) I completely disagree 
 
12. How would you place your views on this: “It is the government’s job to ensure that everyone is provided for.” 
a) I completely agree  
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree  
f) I disagree most of the times  
g) I completely disagree 
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13. If the government had a choice between reducing taxes or spending more on social programs like health care, 
social security, and unemployment benefits, which do you think it should do? 
a) Reduce taxes 
b) Spend more on social programs 
 
14. How would you place your views on this: “I often consider what others will think of me before I make a decision 
in my life.” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree 
f) I disagree most of the times 
g) I completely disagree 
 
15. Do you agree with the following statement: “I regularly give to religious organizations.” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree 
f) I disagree most of the times 
g) I completely disagree 
 
16. Do you agree with the following statement: “I regularly give to charities (excluding religious organizations).” 
a) I completely agree 
b) I agree most of the times 
c) I agree 
d) I am indifferent 
e) I disagree  
f) I disagree most of the times  
g) I completely disagree 
 
17. How well do you know the charity assigned for your group in Part 2? Please rate it in a 1 to 10 scale where 1 
indicates little information and 10 indicates a perfect knowledge about this organization. 
 
18. Are you a United States citizen? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
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Appendix C (For Online Publication) – Supplement to Theoretical Predictions 
Here, we provide theoretical predictions for our experiment under the following utility 
functional form: 
𝑐𝑖
1−𝜃
1−𝜃
+ 𝑎
𝐺1−𝜃
1−𝜃
. The predictions rely on the assumption that everyone is a 
contributor. If this assumption does not hold, quantitative results change but the qualitative results 
on the effect of the tax rate and the degree of waste do not change. Table C1 shows the predictions 
when the public goods utility is weighted at a = 1/2, while Table C2 shows the predictions when 
a = 1/4. 
 
Table C1: Theoretical predictions under specific utility functions with a = 1/2 
 
Tax rate, 𝑡  Waste, 𝑤 𝜃 = 1 
(Cobb-Douglas) 
𝜃 = 3/4 𝜃 = 1/2 𝜃 = 1/4 
0% 0% 4.29 3.50 2.31 0.61 
25% 0% 5.00 4.33 3.21 1.24 
50% 0% 6.00 5.55 4.74 2.86 
75% 0% 7.50 7.50 7.50 7.50 
25% 50% 4.67 4.09 3.13 1.33 
50% 50% 5.29 5.07 4.66 3.57 
75% 50% 6.52 7.02 8.11 11.91 
25% 100% 4.29 3.81 3.00 1.41 
50% 100% 4.29 4.29 4.29 4.29 
75% 100% 4.29 5.21 7.50 17.14 
Maximum possible donation level 
for a given preference structure for 
0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 
10.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
 
 
Table C2: Theoretical predictions under specific utility functions with a = 1/4 
 
Tax rate, 𝑡  Waste, 𝑤 𝜃 = 1 
(Cobb-Douglas) 
𝜃 = 3/4 𝜃 = 1/2 𝜃 = 1/4 
0% 0% 2.31 1.50 0.61 0.04 
25% 0% 2.73 1.88 0.87 0.08 
50% 0% 3.33 2.48 1.34 0.20 
75% 0% 4.29 3.50 2.31 0.61 
25% 50% 2.53 1.77 0.85 0.09 
50% 50% 2.90 2.24 1.32 0.25 
75% 50% 3.66 3.25 2.54 1.19 
25% 100% 2.31 1.64 0.81 0.09 
50% 100% 2.31 1.86 1.20 0.31 
75% 100% 2.31 2.31 2.31 2.31 
Maximum possible donation level 
for a given preference structure for 
0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1 
6.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 
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Appendix D (For Online Publication) – Additional Estimations 
Table D1 provides robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5.1 and Table 4. 
For convenience, regression (1) in Table D1 replicates the estimation results reported in Table 4. 
Regression (2) adds an additional interaction term 𝑡×𝑤. Regression (3) further adds interaction 
terms 𝑤×Unequal, 𝑡×Unequal and 𝑡×𝑤×Unequal. Note that upon adding these controls, the 
qualitative results originally reported in regression (1) do not change. Giving significantly 
decreases in the degree of waste 𝑤, but it does not change in the tax rate 𝑡. 
 
Table D1: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Pooled Pooled Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (1) (2) 
𝑡  -0.27 -0.76 0.06 
  [tax rate] (0.85) (0.79) (1.37) 
𝑤  -4.13*** -4.64*** -3.95** 
  [degree of waste] (0.79) (0.94) (1.33) 
Income 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  [income = $15, $30, $45] (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Unequal 1.66 1.66 1.88 
   [1 if the Unequal treatment] (1.33) (1.33) (1.56) 
𝑡 × 𝑤   1.03 -1.57 
  [interaction term]  (1.84) (2.88) 
𝑡 × Unequal   -1.43 
   [interaction term]   (1.66) 
𝑤 × Unequal   -1.19 
   [interaction term]   (1.77) 
𝑡 × 𝑤 × Unequal    4.51 
  [interaction term]   (3.78) 
Constant -0.30 -0.05 -0.17 
  [constant term] (2.79) (2.76) (2.76) 
Observations 1836 1836 1836 
Clusters 204 204 204 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 
level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
 
Table D2 provides further robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5.1 and 
Table 4. Here, we focus separately on each income group (i.e., participants who received $15, $30, 
or $45) in the Unequal treatment. Consistent with our previous results, regressions (2) and (3) 
show that giving of middle income individuals (who received $30) and high income individuals 
(who received $45) significantly decreases in the degree of waste 𝑤, but it does not change in the 
tax rate 𝑡. Regression (1) also shows that giving of low income individuals (who received $15) 
decreases (although not significantly) when 𝑤 increases.  
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Table D2: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Unequal Unequal Unequal 
Income $15 $30 $45 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (1) (2) 
𝑡  0.11 -2.07 -3.94 
  [tax rate] (1.01) (1.27) (3.21) 
𝑤  -0.77 -7.22*** -10.56* 
  [degree of waste] (0.81) (1.99) (4.30) 
𝑡 × 𝑤  -3.17 5.26 11.07 
  [interaction term] (1.83) (3.16) (7.53) 
Constant 2.29* 4.52*** -1.68 
  [constant term] (1.06) (1.33) (3.72) 
Observations 342 342 342 
Clusters 38 38 38 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 
level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
 
Table D3 provides robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5.1 and Table 4. 
Here, we examine if there is any non-monotonic relationship between giving and income in the 
Unequal treatment. Recall that in Table 4 and Table D1 the Income coefficient is not significant. 
It is possible, however, that there is a non-monotonic relationship between giving and income. To 
examine this, we provide pairwise comparisons of different income individuals. For example, 
regression (1) uses the data from individuals with low income (who received $15) and middle 
income (who received $30). As we can see, the Income coefficient is not significant. The same is 
true for regressions (2) and (3). 
 
Table D3: Tobit regression of giving 
Treatment Unequal Unequal Unequal 
Income $15 and $30 $15 and $45 $30 and $45 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (1) (2) 
𝑡  -0.71 -0.80 -3.05* 
  [tax rate] (0.81) (1.41) (1.46) 
𝑤  -3.51*** -3.91* -9.08*** 
  [degree of waste] (1.00) (1.70) (2.20) 
Income 0.10 0.01 -0.10 
  [income = $15, or $30, or $45] (0.10) (0.08) (0.19) 
𝑡 × 𝑤  0.27 1.00 8.22* 
  [interaction term] (1.79) (3.47) (3.77) 
Constant 0.91 0.42 6.17 
  [constant term] (2.33) (2.70) (7.05) 
Observations 684 684 684 
Clusters 76 76 76 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 
level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table D4 provides robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5.2 and Table 5. 
Instead of estimating separate regressions for risk-averse and risk-neutral/seeking individuals, we 
construct a dummy variable Risk-averse for individuals with 7 or more safe choices. We also 
include the interaction terms. The coefficient on 𝑤 is still significant at the 0.01 level in the Equal 
treatment (regression 1), however its magnitude is substantially lower. On the other hand, in the 
Unequal treatment (regression 2) and pooled data (regression 3), the significance on 𝑤 completely 
disappears. Importantly, in the pooled regression (3), the 𝑤×Risk-averse is significant at 0.05 
level, suggesting that risk aversion mediates the relationship between giving and 𝑤. 
 
Table D4: Giving and the curvature of the utility function 
Treatment Equal Unequal Pooled 
Dependent variable, giving (1) (2) (3) 
𝑡  -0.34 4.00 1.86 
  [tax rate] (1.99) (2.64) (1.74) 
𝑤  -2.59* -1.38 -2.03 
  [degree of waste] (1.26) (1.83) (1.15) 
Income  -0.08 -0.07 
  [income = $15, $30, $45]  (0.13) (0.12) 
Unequal   3.01 
  [1 if the Unequal treatment]   (2.07) 
Risk-averse 3.70 0.22 1.11 
  [1 if risk-averse] (2.35) (5.29) (5.60) 
𝑡 × Risk-averse -0.53 -6.06* -3.48 
  [interaction term] (2.39) (2.93) (1.97) 
𝑤 × Risk-averse -3.08 -3.83 -3.43* 
  [interaction term] (1.95) (2.24) (1.51) 
Income × Risk-averse  0.16 0.15 
  [interaction term]  (0.17) (0.17) 
Unequal × Risk-averse   -2.00 
  [interaction term]   (2.64) 
Constant -0.49 0.80 -0.86 
  [constant term] (1.99) (4.25) (4.31) 
Observations 801 1026 1827 
Clusters 89 114 203 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 0.05, ** at 0.01, and *** at 0.001 
level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the participant level. 
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Table D5 and Table D6 provide robustness checks related to the discussion in Section 5.3 
and Table 6. As in Table 6, we categorize each individual by two dimensions: (1) how they respond 
to changes in 𝑡 and (2) how they respond to changes in 𝑤. However unlike in Table 6, we split the 
data by the Equal and Unequal treatment. Table D5 and Table D6 show that in both treatments 
there are three main types of individuals that account for more than half of all observations: (1) 
participants who always give $0 disregarding 𝑡 and 𝑤, (2) participants who weakly decrease their 
giving in response to increase of 𝑡 and 𝑤, (3) participants who do not change their giving in 𝑡 and 
𝑤. 
 
Table D5: Individual giving response in the Equal treatment 
Giving response 
to changes in the 
tax rate 𝑡 
Giving response  
to changes in the degree of waste 𝑤 
Zero giving  Constant Decreasing Increasing Other Total 
Zero giving 26 0 0 0 0 26 
Constant 0 7 4 1 0 12 
Decreasing 0 0 17 1 3 21 
Increasing 0 0 4 6 4 14 
Other 0 0 7 0 10 17 
Total 26 7 32 8 17 90 
Each number in the table indicates the number of participants that fall into one of the categories. For 
example, there are 17 participants whose giving decreases in 𝑡 and in 𝑤. 
 
Table D6: Individual giving response in the Unequal treatment 
Giving response 
to changes in the 
tax rate 𝑡 
Giving response  
to changes in the degree of waste 𝑤 
Zero giving  Constant Decreasing Increasing Other Total 
Zero giving 30 0 0 0 0 30 
Constant 0 11 9 1 0 21 
Decreasing 0 1 21 1 5 28 
Increasing 0 0 7 7 2 16 
Other 0 0 6 0 13 19 
Total 30 12 43 9 20 114 
Each number in the table indicates the number of participants that fall into one of the categories. For 
example, there are 21 participants whose giving decreases in 𝑡 and in 𝑤. 
 
 
